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Abstract 
Improving energy efficiency is a popular means of reducing consumption of energy. When 
energy efficiency is improved, the marginal cost of energy and energy services will fall, 
leading to an increase in demand. This is called the rebound effect. This paper explains how 
the rebound effect arises and what determines the size of it. By examining existing research, it 
finds that rebound effects are ultimately determined by the price elasticity of demand for 
energy services, but that the research which is most reliable shows that these effects are small. 
The paper subsequently discusses the implications the rebound has on energy policy, with a 
focus on Swedish energy policy. It concludes that policies trying to induce energy efficiency 
improvements by attempting the raise the price of energy will also mitigate the rebound 
effect, indicating that these policies are more appropriate if rebound effects are large. 
 
Keywords: energy efficiency, rebound effect, energy policy, energy economics
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1 Introduction 
Improving energy efficiency is an important part of many countries’ energy policies and is 
universally accepted as an effective means of reducing energy consumption (see e.g. Pacala & 
Socolow, 2003). One of the main objections to decreasing the use of energy is that since it is 
so inextricably linked to economic growth, reducing energy use may compromise living 
standards and wealth. Another fear is that that tighter restriction on energy use would make 
industry less competitive and cause businesses to migrate to places with less stringent 
regulations. The prospect of doing more with less, which incidentally is the title of a European 
Commission report on energy efficiency, has singled out energy efficiency as something of a 
silver bullet in the problem of lower the use of energy without hampering growth. Being able 
to sustain the recent levels of growth and welfare without having to worry about polluting 
emissions or any of the other negative consequences associated with increasing use of energy 
would obviously be desirable. The cost for governments to invest in energy efficiency is at the 
same time estimated to be lower than e.g. transitioning to more renewable energy sources, and 
are sometimes even associated with negative costs (i.e. there are profits to be made from 
investing in energy efficiency) (European Commission, 2006; McKinsey & Co, 2007). For 
these reasons and more, energy efficiency is an important part of many countries’ energy 
policies. 
 
Starting with William Stanley Jevons in 1865 and continuing with a number of energy 
economists from the 1970’s and onward, a problem has been identified regarding the potential 
of energy efficiency in reducing energy consumption. During recent history, technological 
advances have led to ever increasing productivity in using energy as a factor of production. At 
the same time, the use of energy has increased exponentially. While this may come as no 
surprise (after all, energy increases with GDP and GDP has grown constantly over time), 
economic reasoning can be used in order to provide an explanation why energy efficiency 
may not be as effective as hoped. When energy is used more efficiently, the price of a given 
amount of energy falls, ceteris paribus. When prices fall, demand increases so that the 
improvement in efficiency indirectly is offset to some proportion by changes in consumption 
patterns. This is known as the rebound effect (Greening et al., 2000).  
 
The aim of this paper is to examine what determines the occurrence and magnitude of the 
rebound effect according to economic theory. The characteristics of rebound effects will be 
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handled with the help of fairly simply microeconomic tools and concepts such as elasticities 
and static equilibrium models. In light of my findings, policies on energy efficiency, with a 
particular emphasis on Swedish policy, will be evaluated to see which tools best mitigate the 
problems of rebound. In order to do so, I will review literature on the subject and present 
relevant findings.  
 
While it is theoretically possible to show that energy efficiency is in fact entirely counter-
productive, most empirical studies do show that pursuing energy efficiency is worthwhile as 
the rebound effect is at least less than 100 % and in some cases nearly insignificant (Sorrell, 
2009). This paper finds that while there is a number of different policy measures used to 
promote energy efficiency, because the rebound effect is so tightly linked to the real price of 
energy services, policies which aim to increase the price of energy should be most effective in 
mitigating the rebound effect. As will be discussed, there are several problems associated with 
relying on price-policies, and mix of policy options is usually preferred (Sorrell et al., 2004, 
chap. 8). 
   
The disposition of this paper will be as follows. Chapter 2 reviews some previous studies of 
the rebound effect and energy policy. The third chapter gives some definitions of terms and 
concepts which will be used throughout the text. The fourth chapter covers the reasons for 
why improving energy efficiency is desirable and how technological advances have led to 
efficiency gains in the past. The fifth chapter goes through the rebound effect theoretically 
and summarizes some of the empirical evidence for it. The sixth chapter covers what the 
barriers are to increasing energy efficiency, the government’s roll in encouraging this and 
which policy instruments are used generally and more specifically in Sweden. The seventh 
chapter discusses policy options in light of the knowledge about the rebound effect. The 
eighth chapter concludes. 
1.1 Delimitation 
This paper focuses mainly on the microeconomic explanation of how rebound effects arise. 
There is much literature on how rebound effects occur at economy-wide levels of aggregation 
(see e.g. Saunders, 2000), and these findings will be presented insofar as they are necessary to 
analyze the implications of policies on energy efficiency. As will be presented below, the 
studies which have been conducted on the micro level give much more modest estimates of 
rebound effects and are at the same time subject to much less debate regarding the validity of 
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their findings. The economy-wide debate surrounding rebound effects is rarely based on 
empirical data, but rather draws conclusions from theory and historical evidence. There is 
little consensus on how rebound effects manifest themselves at the macro level making it 
difficult to draw any definitive conclusions on the matter. For this reason, rebound effects at 
the macro level are only handled summarily, provided mainly to enable understanding of how 
the debate on the rebound effect has developed historically. 
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2 Earlier research 
Sorrell (2007, 2009), Sorrell & Dimitropolous (2008), Berkhout et al. (2000) and Binswanger 
(2001) have studied the microeconomic interpretation of rebound effects. Reports by various 
organizations have been used to review general policies on energy efficiency (IEA, 2009; 
McKinsey & Co, 2007), as well as work by Schipper & Meyers (1992). A Swedish 
Government Official Report (SOU 2008:25, Energiutredningen, 2008) has been the basis of 
the review of Swedish energy policy.  
 
While most studies on the rebound effect include analyses of policy implications, there are a 
limited number of studies which focus on the implications of rebound effects on energy policy 
in Sweden. The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency has issued a report 
(Naturvårdsverket, 2006) on the problems of rebound effects when designing environmental 
policy. This report focuses mainly on issues belonging to higher levels of aggregation than 
mine, such as welfare and economic growth and discusses how society is to deal with the 
surplus of energy created when energy efficiency increases. Sorrell (2007) has authored a 
report to the UK Energy Research Council on the rebound effect, with a section devoted to 
how energy policy, specifically British policy, can be adapted to mitigate the rebound effect. 
To this end, he finds that policies which target prices may be more effective than other 
policies. Levett has written a chapter in Sorrell & Herring (eds.) (2009) on how to design 
policy in order to account for rebound effects. He also points out some of the issues with 
using price-targeting as a policy response. 
 
This paper attempts to specifically analyze Swedish policy in light of microeconomic findings 
of the rebound effect, an approach which as so far been missing from the corpus of research 
of the rebound effect and energy policy. 
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3 Definitions 
In this section I will define some terms and concepts which will be made use of throughout 
the text.  
 
The energy content of fuels, heat or electricity is commonly measured in Joules, which is the 
basic unit of measurement in the SI system. At the aggregate level, different units are often 
used when measuring total energy use. One of the most common is tons of oil equivalent 
(toe). The relationship between these are 1 EJ (exajoule) = 1018 Joules = 240 × 106 toe. To get 
a sense of scale, annual per capita energy consumption is on average 5.7 toe in Sweden 
(compared to e.g. 8.35 toe in the United State and 3.64 toe in Denmark). The total global 
energy consumption is approximately 53 million toe (US Energy Information Administration, 
2009-11-08).  
 
When referring to electricity it is common to speak in terms of watts (W) and watt-hours 
(Wh) to measure effect. Most often kWh (= 1000 Wh) are used when speaking of personal 
consumption, whereas TWh (= 1012 Wh) in the case of consumption at higher levels of 
aggregation (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, p. xi). It is common to convert the entire energy 
consumption into TWh, and the total Swedish consumption of energy was approximately 624 
TWh in 2007 (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008, p 54). 
 
Technically, energy is neither produced nor consumed. According to the first law of 
thermodynamics, it can only be transformed between different states. Regardless, it is 
commonplace to use these terms when discussing energy in the same way as for “regular” 
goods and services. The second law of thermodynamics implies that as energy is transformed 
from one state to another, there will be losses from conversion. In other words, these 
processes are never completely efficient (see e.g. Areskoug, 2005, pp 62-63). 
 
Energy efficiency can be measured in a number of ways. At the aggregate level, energy 
intensity is often used, which is defined as the amount of energy consumed per unit of GDP 
(see e.g. Schipper & Grubbs, 2000). At the basic level of aggregation, energy efficiency is 
measured as the amount of useful work received for a level of input of energy. This is often 
measured as the thermal efficiency, denoted by the Greek letter eta, η. I will use this notation 
for energy efficiency throughout the text. A more formal definition can be stated as 
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Q
W
≡η ,  (3.1) 
 
where W denotes the useful work or output, and Q the amount of energy put into the process 
(see e.g. Areskoug, 2005, pp 64-66). I will use these definitions throughout the text as well. 
For example, if a 60-watt incandescent light bulb emits around 3 watts of light, this yields a 
thermal efficiency of %505.0603 ===η . 
 
The output or useful work, W, will also be used to denote an energy service. In the above 
example, the energy service is the light provided by the light bulb. In other cases it could be 
driving a car, measured e.g. as the distance driven (where the appropriate input, Q, would be 
fuel), space heating or running a washing machine (Areskoug, 2005, pp 69-72). By definition, 
the energy efficiency is therefore improved if the amount of useful work for a given amount 
of energy increases. The reason for focusing on energy services is that consumption of energy 
per se can hardly be said to yield any utility. Rather, it is necessary to focus on what is 
actually accomplished with the energy that is consumed.  
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4 Energy efficiency 
4.1 Reasons for Investing in Energy Efficiency 
There are several reasons for promoting energy efficiency. In the case of dealing with a finite 
source of energy, improvements in energy efficiency are necessary in order not to deplete the 
resource. Dependence on foreign sources of energy are often seen as risky from a security 
perspective, and being able to be self-sufficient using domestic sources is often politically 
attractive. In the wake of the oil crisis in 1973 many countries started implementing energy 
efficiency policies in order to move away from dependence on oil, the price of which became 
higher and more volatile (IEA, 2009). Today, roughly 50 percent of the energy consumed in 
Europe is imported. This share is expected to rise to 70-80 percent over the next 20 to 30 
years (European Commission, 2006). Currently, the argument for promoting energy efficiency 
receiving most attention is perhaps to enable the decrease in use of fossil fuels and the 
emissions of greenhouse gasses associated with it, reducing the need to make absolute cuts in 
the burning of fossil fuels, the consumption of which is strongly correlated with economic 
growth (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2009, chap. 8). The International Energy Agency, in its World 
Energy Outlook report for 2009, describe energy efficiency as the single most important 
source of CO2 abatement, accounting for more than half of the reduction in carbon emissions 
hoped to be achieved by 2030. The improvement of energy efficiency is considered by many 
to be the most “economic, proven, and readily available means of achieving [a better use of 
the world’s resources]” (IEA, 2009). The International Panel on Climate Change strongly 
urges governments to implement policies targeting improved energy efficiency: “World 
governments should exploit energy efficiency as their energy resource of first choice because 
it is the least expensive and most readily scalable option to support sustainable economic 
growth, enhance national security, and reduce further damage to the climate system” (IPCC, 
2007, p 7). 
 
Some energy consumption is hard to replace with substitutes. Energy services such as lighting 
and heating, or the power needed to run industrial equipment can come from a wide range of 
sources, fuel used in the transport sector is harder to replace. While there are substitutes to 
fossil fuels in the form of biofuels, the potential supply of these greatly falls short of the 
demand for fuel. Increasing energy efficiency in the transport sector is therefore important 
(IEA, 2008). 
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Energy efficiency will not be provided in adequate amounts by the market as energy use is 
associated with negative externalities (Tietenberg & Lewis, 2009, p 183). This is one of the 
barriers to implementing energy efficiency measures which will be discussed below. 
However, many improvements in the efficient use of resources are actually estimated to lead 
to “negative costs”. In other words, there is money to be made from investing in energy 
efficiency. The logic is that implementing measures to increase energy efficiency will lower 
the amount of energy consumed and thereby lowering costs, perhaps enough so that the 
investment is more than covered by the savings in lower energy costs over the life-span of the 
product. For example, in the building sector, improving the efficiency of lighting by replacing 
incandescent light bulbs with CFL:s (compact florescent lights) or LED:s (light-emitting 
diodes) is estimated to save both energy and money if implemented (McKinsey & Co, 2007, p 
34-6). If all the options available to decrease CO2-emissions were ordered according to the 
cost per ton of CO2-equivalent, one would get a marginal abatement cost curve. An example 
of this curve is presented in Figure 3. As can be seen, many of the measures associated with 
negative costs are those which promote energy efficiency. There would seem to be a “free 
lunch” available here, as Brookes (2000) puts it.   
Figure 1. Marginal abatement costs for reducing CO2-emissions. Adapted from McKinsey & Co (2007). 
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4.2 Historical Advances in Energy Efficiency 
Energy efficiency has improved constantly over the course of history due to technological 
progress, which can be characterized as occurring in irregular leaps. For example, Thomas 
Edison’s first electricity-generating plants in the 1880’s could convert less than 10 percent of 
the energy content of coal into electricity, and a light bulb of that era converted approximately 
1 percent of the electricity into light. This meant that 0.1 percent of the energy stored in coal 
was converted into light. Comparable figures in 1994 were 40 percent efficiency in coal 
power plants and 20 percent for the best light bulbs, implying that 8 percent of the energy in 
coal was converted into light. The efficiency of light therefore increased 80-fold in a little 
over a century. Similar advances have been made in steam-driven machines, where the first 
engines could only convert a fraction of a percent of energy into useful work, whereas modern 
turbo generators are more than 40 percent efficient (Smil, 1994, p 12; p 229). Aside from the 
technological advances in energy conversion processes, the increasingly efficient use of 
energy has up until recently, and still is in many cases, a residual of other objectives, such as 
cost-minimization (Brookes, 2000).  
 
Over the past 200 years, the energy intensity of the global economy has fallen as a result of 
technological improvements (Grübler, 1998, pp 280-290). This trend is continuing: since the 
first oil crisis in 1973, energy intensity has fallen considerably in the OECD-countries. In 
2000, the energy intensity had fallen to two thirds of the energy intensity in 1973 (Geller et 
al., 2006). An implication of the ever increasing energy efficiency is that the cost of energy 
services has decreased (Berkhout et al., 2000).  
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5 Rebound effects 
In this chapter I present the economic explanation for the presence of the rebound effect. I 
will also show how the magnitude of the direct rebound effect is related to the own price 
elasticity of demand for energy services and the efficiency elasticity of demand, and when 
more goods are added to the analysis, how the direct and indirect rebound effects can be 
explained in terms of the substitution and income effects. I also briefly review the debate 
regarding economy-wide rebound effects. Finally, I present some empirical estimates of the 
rebound effect. 
5.1 Economic theory 
When there is an increase in energy efficiency, this leads to a decrease in the marginal cost of 
providing an energy service. In a simple model of supply and demand, this is illustrated as an 
outward shift of the supply curve, as depicted in Figure 1. The efficiency gain is associated 
with a lower price corresponding to a larger quantity of the energy service being consumed. 
  
Figure 2. The effect of a lower marginal cost of an energy service. 
 
Further, there will be effects on the quantity demanded of other goods as a lower price of one 
good means that the consumption possibilities of the consumer have expanded due to a larger 
budget. When energy efficiency increases, less energy is used to produce a given energy 
service, but because more of that service is demanded, more energy is consumed. This 
secondary effect is what is called the rebound or take-back effect (Sorrell, 2009). A simple 
P 
Q Q2 Q1 
P2 
P1 
D 
S1 
S2 
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example of this rebound effect is fuel efficiency in cars. Increased fuel efficiency means that a 
longer distance can be driven for a given amount of fuel. The price of fuel (in terms of cost 
per mile) would drop, which would mean that the demand for fuel increases. The consumer 
may then drive more because of cheaper fuel, which would increase the consumption of fuel. 
This is called the direct rebound effect. Further, the cheaper fuel may also expand the car 
owner’s budget so that he can purchase more of other goods which also use energy as a factor 
of production. This indirect rebound effect illustrates the fact that the changes in price and 
energy use will have repercussions on other markets as well. These secondary effects could 
potentially be far-reaching. The energy efficiency improvement obviously causes rebound 
effects on many levels, the first-order effect being relatively easy to quantify, with each 
successive order proving more and more difficult to quantify (Berkhout et al., 2000). 
 
The size of the rebound effect depends on the system boundaries within which it is studied. 
These boundaries could e.g. be a single firm, a market, several markets or the whole 
economy. Sorrell et al. (2009) define rebound effects on three levels: 
 
• Direct rebound effect 
Increasing energy efficiency leads to lower real price of energy services, which causes 
demand for energy to rise. This effect may offset some or all of the energy saving 
made from increasing efficiency. 
 
• Indirect rebound effects 
The lower cost of energy services means that the cost of energy services have 
decreased and the consumer’s budget has expanded. The consumer can now purchase 
more of other goods and services, which also use energy as an input when produced. 
This will further increase the energy use as a consequence of the efficiency increase. 
 
• Economy-wide rebound effects 
The lower real cost of energy causes changes in demand at the economy-wide level, 
with energy as a factor of production replacing other factors of production. The 
increased use of energy from this effect can partially or, arguably, totally offset the 
savings made from increased productivity. 
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Below, I will describe the rebound effects on the three levels more thoroughly, with an 
emphasis on the direct and the indirect rebound effect. 
5.1.1 The direct rebound effect 
In this section I will examine how the magnitude of the rebound effect depends on the price 
elasticity of demand of the energy service. It can then be established that the relationship 
between the rebound effect and the real price of energy services is a key to understanding how 
energy efficiency policy can be designed to take the rebound effect into consideration.  
 
There are a few different methods of handling the direct rebound effect analytically, but they 
all have in common that they define the rebound effect as a function of price elasticity or 
efficiency elasticity of the energy service in question (Sorrel, 2009). I will use the most 
parsimonious one for clarity’s sake. The efficiency elasticity explains the percentage change 
in demand for the energy service (i.e. the useful work) and energy (i.e. the input) respectively 
as the energy efficiency changes by one percent. Denoting the useful work as W and energy as 
Q, efficiency as η (where QW≡η ), and the elasticity as ε, the two efficiency elasticites can 
be defined as 
 
W
W
W
η
η
εη ∂
∂
= , (5.1.1.1) 
 
which is the efficiency elasticity of demand for the energy service, and 
 
Q
Q
Q
η
η
εη ∂
∂
= , (5.1.1.2) 
 
which is the efficiency elasticity of demand for energy (See Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008). 
The relationship between expressions (5.1.1.1) and (5.1.1.2) can be shown to be (see Berkhout 
et al., 2000) 
 
1−= WQ ηη εε , (5.1.1.3) 
 
which tells us that the if the demand for an energy service does not change when energy 
efficiency is increased by one percent, then the demand for energy decreases by one percent. 
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This would mean that net energy savings are the same as engineering savings. Expression 
(5.1.1.1), the efficiency elasticity of demand, can thus be interpreted as the direct rebound 
effect.  
 
Due to data restrictions most research uses price elasticities to estimate the direct rebound 
effect (Sorrell, 2009). When deriving the rebound effect from the price elasticity of demand it 
is assumed that other inputs are held constant (Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008). With the help 
of this exercise, it is possible to show more clearly how the size of the rebound effect is 
determined by the price elasticity of demand. The price of an energy service, PW, can be 
expressed as 
 
ηQW PP = .   (5.1.1.4) 
 
The price of an energy service will go down, ceteris paribus, if the energy efficiency 
increases. From this it follows that the demand for an energy service (W) can be written as a 
function of energy prices and efficiency such that 
 
( )η,QPwW = .1 
 
Similarly, the demand for energy (Q) can be written as  
 
( ) ηη,QPqQ = . 
 
The relationship of price elasticity of demand for energy and the efficiency elasticity of 
demand is 
 
Qηε  
( )
Q
W
Q
Q η
η
ηη
η ∂
∂
=
∂
∂
=  
 
( )
W
WW η
ηηη
η






∂
∂
+
∂
∂
=
11
 
 
W
WW
2
2 1 η
ηη
η 





∂
∂
+−=  
                                                 
1
 Note that w denotes a function, as does q in the subsequent expression. 
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 1−
∂
∂
=
η
η W
W
  (5.1.1.5) 
 1−= Wηε  
 
Using the fact that WQ PP=η , equation (5.1.1.5) can be rewritten as  
 
Qηε  1−∂
∂
=
η
η W
W
 
 ( ) 1−∂
∂
=
WQ
WQ
PP
W
W
PP
 
 1−−= PWε   (5.1.1.6) 
 
Equation (5.1.1.6) says that the efficiency elasticity of demand for energy is equal to minus 
the price elasticity of demand for the energy service minus one. From this equation it is 
evident that a high price elasticity of demand for an energy service corresponds to a large 
rebound effect (Berkhout et al., 2000). Equation (5.1.1.6) implies that a 1 % increase in 
energy efficiency is followed by a decrease in energy demand equal to ( )%1 PWε−  
(Binswanger, 2001). A good is said to be inelastic if 1<ε and elastic if 1>ε  (see e.g. 
Varian, 2006, chap. 15).  
 
In words, the efficiency elasticity of demand of an energy service, which can be interpreted as 
direct rebound effect, is inversely proportional to the price elasticity of demand for an energy 
service. If the price elasticity of demand for e.g. driving a car is large, then a change in the 
price of driving (from better fuel efficiency or lower fuel price) elicits a large change in the 
amount of driving done. As equation (5.1.1.6) shows, a high price elasticity of demand for an 
energy service will also be associated with a high efficiency elasticity of demand. The 
relationship between the price and efficiency elasticities of energy can be shown to 
be 1−−= PQQ εεη , which shows that the rebound effect can be approximated as the own price 
elasticity of demand (Sorrell & Dimitropoulos, 2008). Generally speaking, the more price-
elastic an energy service is, the larger the rebound effect will be. In addition to these, there are 
a number of definitions of the rebound effect which take into consideration such aspects as 
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time costs. A highly elastic demand for energy could lead to the extreme case of the rebound 
effect, namely backfire. 
 
Figure 3. Change in demand due to lower price for different price elasticites. 
 
Figure 3 clearly illustrates what happens to the quantity demanded of an energy service 
depending on the price elasticity. In panel (a), demand is very inelastic, and a price change 
therefore has little effect on the quantity demanded. Panel (b) displays an elastic demand, 
where a price change causes a larger effect on demand.  
 
The exercise presented above begs the question of how elastic demand is for energy services. 
Empirical estimates of the price elasticity of demand for energy services show that they are 
usually inelastic (Sorrell et al., 2009). However, energy services are often interconnected and 
energy markets are full of feedbacks which can make it difficult to analyze them (see e.g. 
Levett, 2009). Energy services are provided through energy systems which include the energy 
source, primary and secondary conversion equipment as well as the equipment to actually 
distribute the energy. This could be, in the case of space heating, oil which is burned in a 
boiler which runs a radiator which in turn is distributed through air ducts. The efficiency of an 
energy system can be defined as the ratio of useful work to total energy input. How to 
measure this depends on what the boundaries of the energy system are and what energy 
services are to be included in the measure. For example, a car may be said to provide the 
useful work of transporting the passengers a certain amount of kilometers. A more energy 
efficient car would thus be one which could transport the passengers farther using the same 
amount of fuel. But it is entirely possible that if energy efficiency is improved, consumers 
choose to buy larger cars which consume more fuel, so that they travel the same distance for a 
P 
P0 
P1 
Q Q Q0 Q0 Q1 Q1 
P 
(a) (b) 
Dinelastic 
Delastic 
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given amount of fuel as before, leaving total fuel consumption unchanged. Under these 
circumstances, perhaps the useful work that is provided by cars should be defined as 
kilometer-tons. There is obviously a deal of complexity in deciding what actually useful work 
is, but this does have a profound consequence in estimating the rebound effect. There is 
evidence that the average fuel economy of cars in the United States decreased by about 10 % 
between 1987 and 2002 as a result of people buying larger cars (Stern, 2006, p 383). 
Therefore, ignoring the possibility of consumers changing cars will give misleading estimates 
of the rebound effect. A similar situation exists for e.g. refrigerators. While an increase in the 
energy efficiency of refrigerators probably will not cause consumers to use their refrigerators 
more, it is possible that larger refrigerators are purchased, which means there is a rebound 
effect. In Japan, average electricity use by refrigerators decreased 15 % between 1979 and 
1997, but the average size increased by 90 % over the same period (Geller et al., 2006). 
Obviously, there are practical limits to how large refrigerators for domestic use can be. There 
is clearly decreasing marginal benefit from energy services so that at a certain point demand is 
saturated (Schipper & Grubb, 2000). If demand is saturated, price changes will only lead to 
minor responses from consumers (Naturvårdsverket, 2006). The size of the rebound effect 
will thus depend on how much the demand for energy services is actually constrained by high 
prices or limited resources of energy. If the consumer is actually held back from driving as 
much as he would like because the price of fuel is too high, then he would be expected to 
drive more with a more efficient engine. If he on the other hand does not demand more of an 
energy service the rebound effect is less of a problem (Greening et al., 2000). Of course, there 
is an obvious possibility that someone expecting to be doing more driving purchases a more 
fuel efficient car and subsequently drives more, which would not be a rebound effect (Small 
& Van Dender, 2007). Furthermore, it seems plausible that the lower price of an energy 
service should attract new consumers of the good whose willingness-to-pay were not met 
previously, which would cause demand for energy services to rise.  
5.1.2 The indirect rebound effect 
The technical derivations of the direct rebound effect generally assume that there is a single-
service market so that the demand for an energy service ultimately is determined by the own-
price elasticity of demand. The above treatment of the rebound effect is the one pioneered by 
Khazzoom in the early 1980’s and is associated with several restrictive assumptions. The 
single-service model implicitly assumes that there are no other services which might be 
substituted for as prices change, so that substitution and income effects are not taken into 
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account. Failing to take these into consideration might lead to overestimating the rebound 
effect (Binswanger, 2001). With the determinants of the magnitude of the rebound effect 
explained, I will now explain when and why the rebound effect occurs with the aid of a 
simple microeconomic supply-and-demand model. Including another good in the analysis also 
allows for explaining the indirect rebound effect. 
 
Consider a consumer who can choose to allocate his income between two goods, X being an 
energy service (such as driving) and Y being a composite good which is everything other than 
good X which the consumer wants to purchase. We assume that the consumer wants to 
maximize his utility so that he consumes at indifference curve which is located as far to the 
right of the origin as possible.  
 
The consumer’s budget constraint is 
 
mYpXp YX ≤+  (5.1.2.1) 
 
where the pi represents the price of each good, X and Y the quantity of each good, and m the 
consumer’s budget.  
 
In Figure 4, the initial budget line for the consumer is the innermost of the two thick lines. 
Consumption takes place at point A, which is associated with utility level U0. When there is 
an increase in energy efficiency in the energy service, the price of that service will drop. The 
endpoints of the budget line represent the amount of each good that could be purchased if the 
consumer’s entire budget were allocated to that good. The price of good X is lowered, so with 
the same budget the consumer can now purchase more of that good. The decrease of the price 
of X is illustrated as a pivot of the budget line around the vertical intercept. This allows the 
consumer to purchase commodity bundle B, which is associated with a higher utility level 
than A. He now consumes X2 of the energy service which is higher than previously. The 
increase in energy efficiency is therefore associated with an increase in demand for the energy 
service, so that the consumption of energy increases. This is a simple illustration of what the 
rebound effect is.  
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Figure 4. Rebound effect for the consumer. Adapted from Berkhout et al. (2000). 
 
It may be illuminating to make a numerical example based on the explanation above. 
Borrowing notation from Berkhout et al. (2000), let E(X) denote the energy use corresponding 
to consuming amount X in the initial situation, and Eʹ(X) the energy use corresponding to 
amount X after the increase in energy efficiency. The energy used in producing amount X will 
be smaller after the increase in efficiency, so that 
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This allows the size of the rebound effect (RE) to be defined as  
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Assuming that Y is a non-energy good so that the increase in energy efficiency does not affect 
it, (5.1.2.2) reduces to 
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Consider a person who drives on average 10 km per day consuming 10 liters of fuel. Assume 
there is a gain in fuel efficiency so that only 6 liters of fuel is required to drive the 10 km but 
that the person now chooses to drive 12 km per day instead. The rebound effect will then be 
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The rebound effect in this case would be 30 %. The engineering savings are calculated as 
( ) %4010410610 ==− . Of these 30 % are “taken back” due to the rebound effect, leaving 
net energy savings resulting from the increase in energy efficiency of 
( ) %2424.04.03.01 ==×− , instead of the 40 % originally predicted.  
 
The rebound effect can be decomposed into an income effect and substitution effect, as 
illustrated in Figure 5 (Greening et al., 2000).  
 
Figure 5. Decomposition of increased demand into substitution and income effects. 
 
The substitution effect arises from the fact the lower price of the energy service allows the 
consumer to substitute consumption of other goods for the cheaper energy service, and the 
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income effect comes from the increase in real income due to the increase energy efficiency 
which allows a higher consumption of all goods, including the energy service (Sorrell, 2009). 
The substitution effect thus corresponds to the direct rebound effect and the income effect to 
the indirect rebound effect. As was presented in section 4.1, one advantage of investing in 
energy efficiency is the money which can be saved as a result of the adoption of more 
efficient energy services. The higher the money-saving potential, the larger the income effect 
should be as more money is made available to spend on other goods and services. However, 
“[t]he size of the [indirect rebound effect] for a consumer is dependent on the share of the 
consumer's total income or total expenditures spent on energy services. Since energy is a 
relatively minor share of an individual consumer's total expenditures, the secondary effects 
are probably insignificant” (Greening et al., 2000). In other words, because expenditure on 
energy services generally do not constitute a large part of an individual’s budget, the budget 
increase resulting from a lower real price of the energy service will not be very large.  
 
An issue raised by Lovins is that many energy services become inferior goods at higher levels 
of income, so that the income effect may reduce the rebound effect (Binswanger, 2001). 
According to the Slutsky identity, the size of the total change in demand is identical to the 
substitution effect plus the income effect. The sign of the substitution effect is always the 
opposite that of the price change (i.e. if the price decreases, demand will increase and vice 
versa) (Varian, 2007, pp 142-3). This means that if an energy service were an inferior good, 
the size of the rebound effect would be smaller than otherwise. However, there is little 
empirical evidence for this, and studies of the OECD countries show that energy consumption 
increases with income levels (Binswanger, 2001). 
 
The rebound effect also applies to firms. Consider a firm producing a good, Y, with two the 
two production factors energy, E, and capital, K, so that the production function can be 
written as 
 
( )EKfY ,= . 
 
The production possibilities are illustrated in Figure 6 where the thicker curves are isoquants 
representing different combinations of K and E for which the same amount of output of Y can 
be attained. The rebound effect will affect a producer as “an improvement of energy 
efficiency implies that he can (a) shift the production factor mix in the long run, and (b), 
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reduce the unit production costs, creating a margin for price setting – dependent on his market 
power.” (Berkhout et al., 2000). Initially, the producer maximizes output at point A, which 
required K1 capital and E1 energy. As energy efficiency is improved, a given amount of output 
can be produced with the same amount of capital but with less energy than before. Because 
the isoquants represent the combinations of production factors required to produce a given 
amount of output, an increase in energy efficiency and the resulting decrease in energy 
required for production is illustrated as a leftward shift of the isoquant, from Y to Yʹ, which 
results in production at point B, with energy use now at E2. However, it is evident that this is 
not an optimal point of production as it is possible to substitute energy (from E2 to E3) for 
capital (from K1 to K2) to produce the same amount of output but at a lower cost. Doing this 
brings production to point C which is associated with a lower production cost than A for the 
same amount of output. With perfect competition, prices will fall to reflect the new level of 
production costs. Depending on how elastic the demand is, the price drop will cause demand 
to rise and production to move to point D. Energy use now moves to E4, and there is a second 
rebound effect, which will depend on how elastic demand is. It is possible that the demand is 
such that E4 > E1, illustrating a case of backfire (Berkhout et al., 2000).   
 
As energy efficiency improves, the firm will increase the use of energy at the expense of other 
inputs. This will occur until the marginal productivities of all factors are equal. This will 
induce the firm to consume more energy services instead of other inputs. The elasticity of 
substitution will decide how much of the other inputs are substituted for energy services and 
is therefore an important determinant of how large the rebound effect will be. An elasticity of 
substitution of 1 implies that as marginal rate of substitution between two factors of 
production changes by one percent, the ratio of inputs to production change by one percent. If 
there is an increase in the productivity of energy and the elasticity of substitution between 
energy and, say, capital, is less than 1, then and increase in energy efficiency will lead to a net 
decrease in energy use. If it is greater than 1, then the total energy consumption will increase 
as a result of the increased productivity of energy (Greening et al., 2000).  
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Figure 6. Rebound effects for a producer. Adapted from Berkhout et al. (2000). 
 
It is, of course, entirely possible to extend this example to a consumer ”producing” household 
energy services such the temperature in a room using heating or insulation as mentioned 
above. 
 
As mentioned above, when taking more markets and goods into account, elasticity of 
substitution, i.e. the ease with which one factor can be replaced by another in production is an 
important determinant of the size of the rebound effect (Birol & Kepler, 2000). Many energy 
efficiency improvements can be characterized as substituting capital for energy. An example 
of this could be the possible combinations of energy and capital in order to maintain a certain 
indoor temperature, where it is possible to substitute fuel (energy) for insulation (capital). 
However, the installation and maintenance of this capital also consumes energy. As a second 
example, if the energy efficiency in steel production were to increase, then the price of steel 
should drop. Industries which use steel as input in production would then be able to pass 
savings on to producers of goods further down the production chain, so that the price of e.g. 
cars would decrease, thereby increasing the demand for cars as well as fuel so that total 
energy use might increase. Because of the many possible feedback mechanisms and 
complexities, it is difficult to estimate these indirect rebound effects, but they are generally 
believed to be smaller than the direct rebound effect due to the fact mentioned above that 
energy constitutes a relatively minor share of both consumers’ and producers’ budgets 
(Sorrell, 2007).   
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Some studies point out that rebound effects with respect to energy efficiency can be partly 
explained by the invention and adoption of increasingly time-saving equipment. Many 
technological innovations are designed to save time (rather than to explicitly save energy), but 
also consume more energy. This is especially true for periods of low energy prices, as 
incentives to invest in energy efficiency will be lower. Illustrations include traveling by car 
instead of horse or on foot, using electric razors instead of visiting a barber and writing e-
mails instead of letters. Each of these transitions speeds up the process of transportation, 
shaving and correspondence respectively, but may require more energy in order to do so. The 
“time cost” of performing these various tasks decreases, which, by the same reasoning as for 
the rebound effect with respect to energy, means that consumers demand more of that 
particular service. Similarly, with more time on their hands, consumers are now free to engage 
in other activities which in turn require energy. These effects should be stronger the higher 
wages are as the opportunity cost of time increases (Binswanger, 2001). Depending on how 
consumers chose to spend this extra time, there may be an increase in total energy 
consumption so that a rebound effect with respect to time is observed (Naturvårdsverket, 
2006).  
5.1.3 Economy-wide effects 
At the highest level of aggregation, the rebound effects can be explained as the increase in 
energy consumption arising from productivity gains. The exact nature of this relationship is a 
matter of debate (Sorrell, 2009). The issue is whether it can be determined if the increase in 
demand can be attributed to improved productivity (Schipper & Grubb, 2000).  
 
William Stanley Jevons is credited with first identifying this effect. Jevons’s concern was 
identifying the risk of Great Britain’s running out of coal, which at the time was the driving 
force behind the county’s industry, and that in a more efficient usage of coal “we have, it is 
supposed, the means of completely neutralising the evils of scarce and costly fuel” (Jevons, 
1865, p 137). However, Jevons refuted this notion: “It is wholly a confusion of ideas to 
suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished consumption. The very 
contrary is the truth.” (ibid, p 140). Additionally, Jevons outlines how an increase in 
efficiency in one factor of the economy, while it may not lead to increased consumption in 
itself, has repercussions on other parts, so that the increasingly efficient use of coal in one 
 27 
sector would put further strains on the coal reserves due to more activity in other sectors (ibid, 
pp 141-142). 
 
Jevons’ Paradox describes the most extreme version of the rebound effect, sometimes called 
“backfire” (Sorrell, 2009), a scenario where a gain in efficiency of using a resource will lead 
to a net increase in the use of it. As I have described above, measures to increase energy 
efficiency play a prominent roll in many countries’ energy policies, especially in light of 
environmental issues associated with the use of fossil fuels. A case in point for Jevons is the 
2/3 reduction of coal used to produce one ton of iron in Scotland between 1830 and 1863 
leading to a ten-fold increase in the consumption of iron, “not to speak of the indirect effect of 
cheap iron in accelerating other coal-consuming branches of industry” (Jevons, 1865, p. 154). 
These feedback effects could be elaborated upon to claim that the lower cost of iron made 
both steam engines (which burn the coal) as well as railways (which transport the coal) 
cheaper, exacerbating the rebound effect (Sorrel, 2009). 
 
Papers published by Khazzoom and Brookes during the late 1970’s and 80’s led to a heated 
debate regarding the merits of increasing energy efficiency as a means to reduce energy use. 
According to them, the energy consumption today is larger than it would have been had 
energy efficiency efforts not been undertaken. The papers sparked a debate between 
economists which was reignited in light of concerns of global warming in the early 1990’s. 
While both camps seem to agree that there are microeconomic rebound effects, how this 
translates into effects at the economy-wide level, and whether or not increase energy 
efficiency leads to backfire has been a matter of fierce debate. The supporters of using energy 
efficiency as means to reduce energy use argue that there is a difference between 
improvements in energy efficiency arising from technological development and 
improvements arising as a result of political intervention. Sectors where technological 
advances are likely to be made are those where demand is sensitive to price, whereas markets 
where demand is inelastic are less likely to induce “naturally” occurring improvements in 
efficiency. But these are often the sectors where most gains can be realized, and therefore 
often the target of government policy. The markets where there are natural incentives to 
improve energy efficiency will be constrained by high prices or a limited supply of energy. In 
these cases there would be a risk of encountering large rebound effects, but on markets where 
there are no constraints the risks are smaller. The rebound effect arising from policy-driven 
gains in energy efficiency would therefore be significantly smaller than those caused by 
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technological advances which are driven by the will to overcome constraints in the form of 
high prices or low supply. As a consequence, using the rebound effects seen in naturally 
occurring technological development as evidence for rebound effects in policy-driven energy 
efficiency-increases is not valid, according to those who do not believe large rebound effects 
at the economy-wide level (Grubb, 1990). Those who argue that improving energy efficiency 
causes backfire do not believe in extrapolating results obtained at the microeconomic level to 
the economy-wide level, but that this ignores certain complexities. They stress the importance 
of increased productivity in other factors of production as an explanation for the fact that 
energy intensity has fallen (Brookes, 1990). These claims have empirical support. Schurr 
(1985) shows that during the period from World War I to the oil crisis, energy use per hour 
worked in the United States rose, but that the energy intensity of the economy fell as a result 
of the economy growing faster than energy use. It is important to keep in mind that this debate 
centers on the question of whether there is backfire or not at the economy-wide level, i.e. if 
the rebound effect is greater than 100 %.  
 
Saunders (1992) gives the hypothesis that increased energy efficiency at the micro level will 
lead to higher energy consumption at the economy-wide level the name the Khazzoom-
Brookes postulate and incorporates it into a neoclassical growth model. He shows that with a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, increases in energy efficiency (energy-augmenting 
technological change) causes energy consumption to increase. At the same time, all 
technological improvements, which are the driving force behind economic growth in this 
framework, raise consumption per capita, so that more energy is demanded. While this is 
hardly contentious, the fact is that “pure” energy productivity gains caused energy use to 
increase due to cheaper energy substituting for capital and/or labor and the increase in 
consumption per capita in the model. Because energy use grows at the same rate as GDP in 
the absence of efficiency gains, the implication is that increased energy efficiency leads to 
higher levels of energy consumption. An economy-wide rebound effect can be seen as the 
increased use of energy due to higher GDP caused by improving energy efficiency (Schipper 
& Grubb, 2000). As the increase in productivity of any factor of production would raise total 
output, it is argued that the rise in multifactor productivity, whether from increases in the 
productivity of energy, labor, capital, etc., could completely offset the gains in energy 
efficiency by increasing the energy use. Therefore, a rise in productivity at the micro-level 
could at the highest level of aggregation of energy use lead to a net increase in the use of 
energy (Brookes, 2000). As Grübler (1998, p 289) puts it: “whatever technology has ‘given’ 
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in the form of increase environmental productivity, it has more than ‘taken back’ through 
concomitant increases in output”. 
 
While it is quite simple to demonstrate theoretically the existence of the rebound effect, 
empirically it has proven to be more difficult (Saunders, 2000). Economy-wide rebound 
effects have been estimated both using computer models and econometric estimates. 
Computer modeling gives varying results depending on how parameters are defined as well as 
general assumption of how markets and actors behave. Many of the findings from analyses at 
the micro-level are expected to be found at the economy-wide level as well: “Rebound effects 
may be expected to be larger in energy intensive sectors and also where the input mix is fairly 
flexible and where the demand for products is relatively price-elastic” (Sorrell, 2007, p 51). 
The existence of an economy-wide rebound effect is most often supported with historical 
evidence of ever increasing levels of technological advances coupled with more energy being 
consumed (Brookes, 2000).  
5.2 Empirical estimates of the rebound effect 
There are a number of studies which estimate the direct rebound effects for different energy 
services. The best documented are those for automotive transport and domestic space heating 
in OECD-countries as this is where most data is available. The size of estimations of the 
rebound effect will also be determined by the definition used, resulting in quite varying 
estimates (Greening, 2000).  
 
Various studies employing different methods and definitions of the rebound effect have been 
conducted over the past years. Understandably, they come to quite different conclusions. The 
most well-documented rebound effects are the direct rebound effects, which are the ones 
which will be focused upon here. The conclusion of several studies is that demand for energy 
services is inelastic for OECD-countries, which means that there is little risk of large direct 
rebound effects or backfire. However, calculated elasticities must be treated with caution as 
they are rarely stable and vary with price-levels, price-change expectations and saturation 
(Sorrell et al., 2009). Personal transport is the energy service for which the rebound effect has 
been most frequently studied. Meta-analyses by Greening et al. (2000) and Sorrell et al. 
(2009) put the direct rebound effect for personal transport between 10 % and 30 %, but there 
is a rather large variance depending over different time scales, from 3 % to almost 90 %. In 
the case of the former interval, it would mean that energy efficiency improvements in the 
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personal transport sector are associated with fuel savings of at least 70 % of the improvement 
in OECD countries. 
 
Rebound effects for indoor heating are also relatively well-documented. Many of these studies 
also take a number of other variables into account, such as income of the household. Results 
show that the rebound effect is larger for low-income households, which may be due to the 
fact that their indoor temperatures are lower from the beginning. This is a good illustration of 
saturation, as indoor temperatures approach 21 °C, the rebound effect starts to decline. 
Reasonably, there is a limit as to how high someone would want their indoor temperature to 
be, much as there are limits to how much someone would drive regardless of the fuel prices. 
The rebound effects are estimated less accurately for indoor heating than transport, and are 
put at between 10 % and 60 %, with a mean value of 20 % (Sorrell, 2009). 
End use Range of estimates (percent) "Best guess" (percent) 
Personal automotive transport 3–87 10–30 
Household heating 0.6–60 10–30 
House cooling 1–26 1–26 
Other consumer energy services 0–41 < 20 
 
Table 1. Empirical estimates of direct rebound effects for different energy services. Source:  Sorrel et al. (2009). 
 
While not as numerous, there are estimates of the rebound effect in other household services 
as well, where the rebound effect for lighting is estimated to be less than 10 % (Sorrell, 2009) 
and the rebound effect for clothes washing is found to be around 6 % in a thorough study by 
Davis (2008). 
 
Small & Van Dender (2007) argue that the rebound effects decrease with income levels as the 
cost of energy (fuel in their study) becomes a small part of the consumer’s budget. Rising 
incomes couples with decreasing real prices of fuel had led to the rebound effect for the years 
1997-2001 being only half as large as the period 1966-2001. 
 
Specifically for Sweden, Nässén & Holmberg (2009) have quantified the rebound effects and 
found it to be 5-15 % in most cases, while the rebound effect arising from switching from a 
large to a small car is 48 %. 
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While the distinction between the direct and indirect rebound effects are fairly straight-
forward to handle theoretically, as seen above, it is generally ignored in empirical estimates of 
the rebound effect (Binswanger, 2001), usually because of restrictions due to data availability 
(Greening et al., 2000).  
 
Evidence for higher-order rebound effects is limited. Most of the findings are based on 
models and simulations (Greening et al., 2000). At the economy-wide level, the most common 
measure of energy efficiency is energy intensity, which can change without there being any 
change in the energy efficiency of individual equipment, thereby giving a misleading 
indication of energy efficiency improvements (Herring, 1998). The lack of evidence for 
economy-wide rebound effects means that the discussions have been mostly theoretical and 
speculative, using historical evidence as the main evidence for claims of large rebound effects 
(Sorrell, 2009). Evidently, it is hard to translate what happens with demand at the micro level 
when the efficiency of equipment is improved into how the entire economy reacts when the 
productivity of energy as a factor of production is increased. 
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6 Policy 
In this section I will examine some of the barriers which explain why energy efficiency is not 
implemented to the extent that the cost-saving estimates presented earlier suggest it should be. 
Following this, I will present some of the basic ideas behind policies looking to overcome 
these barriers and summarize the specific policies in place in Sweden and what their results 
have been.  
6.1 Barriers to implementing energy efficiency policies 
This section reviews some of the factors that hinder the implementation of energy efficiency 
policies. The fact that these policies do not always lead to energy savings is one issue (see e.g. 
Oikonomou et al., 2009), but this section focuses on barriers to actually getting the policies in 
place. As described above, energy efficiency has improved considerably in the past through 
technological progress, but for reasons stated earlier, it is by many seen as desirable to speed 
up this process (European Commission, 2006). However, there are obstacles which hinder the 
implementation of such measures. The fact that energy efficiency is not as prioritized as it 
should be given the cost-saving potentials presented above, indicates the presence of hidden 
costs, market failures or other barriers (Stern, 2006, p. 378). One obstacle to switching over to 
more efficient technology is the cost. While neoclassical economic theory assumes that there 
are no adjustment costs in its models (Berkhout et al., 2000), this is obviously not true in 
reality. Even if it is plausible that a large initial investment in a new, more efficient piece of 
equipment will pay off over time as energy use and therefore costs decrease, it has been 
shown that consumers generally expect that household investments to have payback periods 
of 2-3 years. Even if this shortsightedness is overcome, consumers may not afford upgrading 
their existing stock of appliances (McKinsey & Co, 2007). 
 
A second barrier is the pricing of energy. Energy prices are often lower than their true cost, a 
fact which affects investment decisions. There are several reasons for this, one being direct 
and indirect subsidies which lower the cost of energy to below marginal costs. A further issue 
is that the externalities associated with producing energy, such as pollution and emissions 
associated with the burning of fossil fuels are rarely reflected in the price of energy which is a 
typical case of a market failure leading to underinvestment in energy efficiency (Schipper & 
Meyers, 1992, pp 305-6).  
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A third barrier is the invisibility of energy consumption. For example, it is often difficult to 
determine how much each appliance in a household contributes to total energy consumption 
as this commonly lumped together in either in monthly or yearly electricity bills (McKinsey 
& Co, 2007). The energy use of households especially seems to be domesticated in a way that 
prevents individuals from realizing how the energy systems of their homes function 
(Löfström, 2008). This is perhaps not as big a problem for large firms as they tend to be more 
mindful of cost-saving potentials and have the technical staff to evaluate and implement these 
options (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, p 307). It may also be the case that households and small 
businesses do not care about energy costs as they often make up a small portion of total 
expenditure, and are therefore unwilling to take steps to increase energy efficiency (Grubb, 
1990). The absence of a relevant price mechanism implies that consumers do not consider any 
budget optimization pertaining to energy costs (Birol & Keppler, 2000) In addition to not 
realizing the economic consequences of their energy use, consumers may not understand the 
environmental impacts their consumption patterns have (Stern, 2006, p 385). 
 
A fourth barrier, common in the building sector, is the problem of “misplaced incentives” 2 
(Schipper & Meyers, 1992 p 307). In many buildings, the constructor, owner and occupant are 
often different parties, which means that their interests in promoting energy efficiency are not 
always aligned. While the payer of the electricity bill wants this to be as small as possible, the 
construction firm may be more interested in cost-minimization and therefore installs cheaper 
but perhaps less efficient heating, appliances, etc. (McKinsey 2007). According to the IEA, of 
the energy used for refrigerators, space heating, water heating and lighting in the United 
States, more than 30 % was affected by problems of misplaced incentives (IEA 2007, p 191). 
 
Another class of barriers is social and institutional norms which are strong determinants of 
behavior. In the case of perfect markets, market mechanisms are preferred to regulatory 
measures, but where there are barriers in the form of e.g. market failures, regulation may be 
appropriate. In a case where externalities are not included in the price of energy, banning 
certain chemicals or setting efficiency standards can remove the most environmentally 
harmful elements from the market entirely (Stern, 2006, p 377).  
 
                                                 
2
 This is a case of a principal-agent problem (IEA, 2007) which is also known as the “landlord-tenant problem” 
(Stern, 2006, p 380). 
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These are some of the barriers which prevent energy efficiency investments from being as 
large as they optimally should. The aim of policies encouraging energy efficiency aim at 
removing these barriers or at least mitigate them. 
6.2 General policy instruments for increasing energy efficiency 
In this section is will summarize some of the policies used to promote energy efficiency in 
order to see how they affect the rebound effect. As several studies point out, investment in 
energy efficiency has been an integral part of many countries’ energy policies since the oil 
crises of the 1970’s. Policies aiming to increase energy efficiency will attempt to overcome 
the barriers to energy efficiency as discussed above. There are two main options for 
influencing energy efficiency through policy measures: changing relative prices so that energy 
becomes more expensive or introducing new, more productive technology. These are not 
mutually exclusive. Because energy efficiency gains and the energy intensities at higher levels 
of aggregation may deviate, as will be elaborated upon below, one of the main objectives of 
policies on energy efficiency must be to ensure that “improvements in technical energy 
efficiency translate to the largest possible extent into corresponding reductions in energy 
intensities” (Birol & Keppler, 2000).  
 
The fact that energy prices do not reflect the true cost of energy is a market failure which 
limits the demand for energy efficiency savings. Other barriers are debatable if they actually 
are true market failures or rather normal aspects of a market economy, and if they can, or 
indeed should, be addressed by government policy. Appropriate energy policy may therefore 
see to correcting true market failures and provide information to consumers and investors in 
order to reduce uncertainty and risk associated with new technology. This can be done by 
targeting both existing and new goods and capital stock (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, pp 306-8).   
 
As mentioned above, one of the main objectives of energy policy is to ensure that energy 
prices correctly reflect the societal cost of its use or at least that the price is equal to marginal 
cost. Many countries have subsidies which distort the price signals on the market. Removal of 
these, however politically unpopular, is one policy which would move the country toward 
encouraging energy efficiency. The production and consumption of energy is often associated 
with different externalities which are not reflected in the price. Most notable is pollution and 
emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels. If energy prices were to internalize these 
externalities they would rise, causing energy efficiency investments to be more lucrative. 
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There are plenty of examples of how this could be done, e.g. by a tax on emissions, subsidies 
to more efficiency technology or by emission trading schemes (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, p. 
311-25). As energy prices often are lower than what they would be if they reflected the entire 
societal cost, moving towards this theoretical equality would increase the price of energy. 
Following the induced innovation hypothesis posited by John Hicks, an increase in the price 
of a factor would spur innovation directed at economizing that factor (Newell et al., 1999). 
Raising the price of energy would therefore stimulate both a shift towards using the most 
efficient existing technology as well as spurring innovation where new technology is 
perfected. 
 
Information may be provided in order to reduce the risk associated with investments in energy 
efficiency. This is especially important for households and small businesses (Schipper & 
Meyers 1992, p 312). This often comes in the shape of labeling of e.g. appliances, but there 
are also possibilities of energy auditing or counseling. Labeling of appliances combined with 
efficiency standards has been successful in reducing electricity usage in appliances (Geller et 
al., 2006). For example, two different television sets of similar type and size may differ in 
energy consumption by as much as 33 %. A clearer labeling of these differences may 
influence consumption choices (McKinsey 2007, p 37). Policies with goals of providing 
increased information are meant to tackle the problem of visualization described above. Apart 
from labeling, requiring utilities to provide clients with regular, accurate and informative 
energy bills is one way of informing households and firms of their energy consumption 
pattern. More sophisticated methods such as implementing smart meters in homes and work-
places, which give detailed information on energy use in real time, or gear shift indicators 
which let car drivers know when they should shift gears in order to maximize fuel efficiency, 
are other examples of how energy efficiency potentials can be revealed (Stern, 2006) 
 
Imposing regulations and standards for equipment of buildings which regulate their energy 
efficiency is another common policy option used by governments. Design standards “can 
create scale economies for strategically important technologies” (Stern, 2006, p 383). 
Sometimes these come in the shape of agreements between the government and producers of 
certain equipment. (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, p 313) In Germany, an agreement between 
major industry and utilities to reduce the CO2-intensity by 28 % between 1990 and 2005 is 
one example of this. Japan has enacted the “Front Runner” program, whereby the most energy 
efficient TV, refrigerator, toilet seat warmer etc. sets the standard for all products on that 
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market to live up to. In the United States, standards for fuel economy in cars, CAFE-
standards, have helped to increase the fuel efficiency in cars by more than 100 % from 1975 
to 1988 (Geller et al., 2006).  
 
Financial incentives are sometimes used to promote energy efficiency, either by offering 
rewards for efficiency in the shape of lower taxes, low-interest loans, exemptions from certain 
fees, etc, or by punishing poor efficiency with higher taxes or other fees (Schipper & Meyers, 
1992, p 314-5). In many countries it is possible to obtain low-interest loans to support 
construction of buildings with low environmental impact (Geller et al., 2006, p 6).  
 
Direct support to research and development of new technology is also a crucial policy 
instrument for governments to use. While private investments focus on short and medium 
term improvements in energy efficiency, government spending can be used to finance basic 
research which could improve energy efficiency in the long term as these are often less 
economically interesting for companies to invest in, as well as being associated with higher 
risk (Schpper & Meyers, 1992, p 315).  Billions of dollars were granted to R&D related to 
energy efficiency in the United States following the oil crises. This was also a common policy 
response in Western European countries (Geller et al., 2006).  
 
Both the use of energy and the efficiency with which it is used has increased immensely 
during the past centuries and decades, making the effect of energy efficiency programs hard to 
evaluate by simply observing time series of energy use. A common definition of energy 
efficiency at the economy-wide level is, as mentioned earlier, energy intensity. This is the 
ratio of units of GDP per unit of energy consumed. Energy intensity may be misleading, 
however, as in many advanced economies the service sector is replacing heavy industry as a 
source of income; the service sector consuming less energy than e.g. manufacturing.  Usually, 
the impacts of energy efficiency investments are calculated based on hypothetical scenarios of 
what energy consumption would look like hade the investment not been made. Obviously, 
whether or not potential rebound effects are included in these calculation may have a large 
effect on what the impacts are found to be. As will be demonstrated in the next section, 
energy savings vary considerably depending on whether the full (potential) rebound effect is 
taken into account or not.   
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A recent report by the IEA (2009) reports data showing the effects of various energy policies 
on energy efficiency. Policies targeting households have played a key roll in improving 
energy efficiency in appliances and space heating since 1990, but these were offset by larger 
appliances being used as well as a larger number of small appliances. In the service sector, it 
is clear that energy intensity fell between the years 1990 and 2006, but it is difficult to 
determine whether or not this was the result of policies targeting energy efficiency. Most 
policies targeting personal transport have been aimed at increasing the fuel economy of cars. 
While this has increased by 15 % over the period surveyed, increased driving distances and 
number of cars has offset the gains from energy efficiency. 
 
Most policies target end-use efficiency, i.e. the energy use in appliances, cars etc. rather than 
actually trying to alter consumer behavior (Geller et al., 2006) or increase the efficiency in the 
generation of electricity, the potential for which in many cases is approaching the theoretical 
maxima which the laws of thermodynamics dictate (Smil, 1994, p. 229).  
6.3 Swedish policy 
In this section I will summarize the policies used specifically in Sweden and what effects they 
have had on energy efficiency. In 2006, the European Union issued a directive mandating 
member states to undertake cost-effective, viable and reasonable measures in order to improve 
energy efficiency. A quantitative goal of 9 percent energy savings from energy efficiency of 
the baseline 2001-2005 values by 2016 was set. This is a part of the general target of reducing 
energy use by 20 % by 2020 set up by the EU, which, however, is not binding 
(Energiutredningen, 2008). Directives only specify the goal which is to be attained, the 
specifics of how this is done are up to the member states themselves to outline. Swedish 
policy on energy efficiency had been in place long before the directive, and earlier measures 
may in some cases be incorporated into the final 9 percent goal. In the case of Sweden, 
approximately half of the savings in 2016 (which are expected to exceed 9 percent) are 
savings derived from earlier energy efficiency policies between 1991 and 2005 
(Energiutredningen, 2008). There are both specific policies targeting individual sectors of the 
economy, as well as more general policy measures such as energy taxes.  
6.3.1 Taxes 
Sweden taxes energy in a number of ways: both electricity and fuel are taxed, as well as 
emissions of CO2 and sulfur dioxide (SO2). The tax system is rather complex and 
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differentiated depending on usage area and source, with industry receiving exemptions or 
reductions (Energiutredningen, 2008). Improving energy efficiency is one of the explicit goals 
of energy taxation (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008).  
6.3.2 Buildings and residential sector 
The building sector is where the largest gains from energy efficiency improvements are 
expected to be realized (Energiutredningen, 2008). The Swedish government subsidizes 
installation of more efficient heating systems in homes and places of business. There is a law 
requiring appliances to be labeled according to their energy efficiency with the aim of helping 
consumers in their purchasing decisions. The labeling is routinely followed up by controls at 
the locations of retailers. There is also a program of energy counseling where independent 
counselors help households, small businesses and organizations make decisions aimed at 
reducing energy use and increasing energy efficiency. In an agreement between the 
government and several agents in the building sector, banks, insurance companies as well as 
local government where the parties promise to work towards a set of goals which will 
promote sustainable development in the building sector, one of them being to reduce the 
amount of energy used through gains in energy efficiency (Swedish Energy Agency, 2007). In 
2006, a law was passed that all new building must have energy declarations which are hoped 
to aid in identifying cost-effective efficiency improvements in individual buildings as well as 
clarifying the efficiency of a building for buyers, sellers and tenants. There are also minimum 
requirements pertaining to energy efficiency which must be fulfilled when renovating or 
constructing new buildings. In the long run, investments in research, development and 
demonstration are key instruments (Energiutredningen, 2008). 
6.3.3 Industry 
In 2004 the Program for Energy Efficiency was launched whereby a tax on electricity used by 
the manufacturing industry was imposed. Firms were given the possibility of receiving a full 
tax exemption provided they participate in a five-year program designed to help them improve 
the efficient use of electricity (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008). It is possible that this program 
will be extended to include smaller firms (Energiutredningen, 2008). A service called Energy 
Performance Contracting involves companies which analyze the technical and operational 
status of industries and buildings and compile the results into a program for increasing energy 
efficiency which the company performing the analysis guarantees will be profitable. This 
way, work dealing with making buildings and industries more efficient are outsourced to a 
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third party, relieving the industries and operators of building of that burden (Swedish Energy 
Agency, 2007). 
6.3.4 Transport 
Fuel tax is the main way in which consumption of fuel is disincentivized and transition to 
low-energy modes of travel. Cars which can run on ethanol or biogas receive tax reductions, 
as do electric cars. Taxation of new automobiles (model 2006 or newer) is CO2-differentiated, 
i.e. based on the amount of carbon dioxide they emit, as opposed to weight as was the 
situation previously, in addition to a basic tax. There is also a system of automatic speed 
control cameras erected along Swedish roads, a positive side effect of which is the reduction 
of fuel consumed by cars, as lower average speeds lead to lower fuel consumption of cars and 
can therefore be seen as a measure to increase energy efficiency. Education in “ecodriving” is 
now a part of Swedish driving school sessions, teaching prospective drivers how to drive 
more efficiently. In a longer perspective, improving social planning with respect to 
environmental issues and investments in research, development and demonstration are 
important policies (Energiutrednigen, 2008). 
6.3.5 Policy results and forecasts 
The Swedish Energy Agency estimates that energy use in Sweden has decreased by 82 
TWh/year as a result of measures undertaken in order to increase energy efficiency. Forecasts 
of energy savings resulting from efficiency gains up 2016 are made under two scenarios, 
Scenario 1 where taxes are assumed to remain at the same level as in 2005, and Scenario 2 
where taxes are assumed to rise at the same rate as during the period 1970-2005. Further, for 
each scenario savings are calculated both without the rebound effect taken into consideration 
as well as the full rebound effect taken into consideration. 
 
Sector Scenario 1 Energy efficiency gains 
(TWh/year) 2016 
Scenario 2 Energy efficiency gains 
(TWh/year) 2016 
 Full rebound 
effect 
No rebound 
effect 
Full rebound 
effect 
No rebound 
effect 
Buildings 0,01 4,51 6,18 * 63,25 * 
Industry (non-trading) 0,03 0,94 0,45 2,28 
Transports 0,07 0,45 0,67 3,97 
Total 0,11 5,9 7,4 69,5 
 
Table 2. Projected energy savings from improvements in energy efficiency. Source: Swedish Energy Agency. 
Note: * indicates insignificant estimates. 
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Evidently, including a full rebound effect (i.e. 100 %) has a significant effect on estimates of 
how effective policies aiming at improving energy efficiency will be. The numbers presented 
in each column are the bounds between which the efficiency gains can be expected to end up 
depending on the size of the rebound effect. This interval is significant; it is obviously of 
interest estimating how large the rebound effects might be. 
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7 Discussion 
Much hope is pinned on energy efficiency helping to reduce energy use and thereby emissions 
of greenhouse gases. However, taking the rebound effect into account, policies aiming to 
increase energy efficiency may not be as effective as intended. While few people would 
probably argue to try to halt technological progress, the source of many efficiency gains, it is 
perhaps relevant to question whether governmental policy should target energy efficiency as a 
means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. There are, after all, many different options to 
achieve this (see e.g. Pacala & Socolow, 2003). Given the findings presented in section 5.2, 
the rebound effect only offsets a small portion of the reduction in energy use due to efficiency 
gains, meaning that energy efficiency probably still is worth pursuing for policymakers. This 
does not mean that the rebound effect should be ignored. The fact that energy efficiency 
seems to have so much potential for reducing energy consumption means that it should be of 
interest to mitigate these effects. Because the rebound effect arises mainly due to the price-
sensitivity of end-users of energy services, policies which target the real prices of these 
services may be able to mitigate the rebound effect. However, as will be discussed shortly, 
there are problems associated with such policies. 
 
In chapter 6, I presented some policies used to promote energy efficiency. These can be 
divided into those which directly target prices and those which do not. Obviously, energy 
taxation is the main example of these policy instruments, which is used in Sweden in e.g. the 
transport sector.  In many parts of the world, energy is subsidized. Removing these subsidies 
would be one way to raise the price of energy services (Naturvårdsverket, 2006), but after 
they have been removed completely, some price-targeting policy would have to be 
implemented. Policies which do not target energy prices, such as information campaigns, and 
various programs like those in the Swedish building sector, would then not be able to cope 
with rebound effects. 
 
As was presented in section 5.1.1, the direct rebound effects is closely related to the own price 
elasticity of demand for energy services. It is also the case that the price elasticity is lower 
when real prices are at a lower level. This means that rebound effects can be expected to be 
larger for those energy services that are relatively expensive and low for those that are 
relatively cheap.  
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As the direct rebound effect is expected to be larger where energy demand is more elastic, and 
research has indicated that the demand for energy services usually is inelastic, this would 
indicate that behavioral changes are not a threat to energy efficiency policies. Energy costs 
usually constitute small shares of both firms’ and households’ total budgets.  
 
Assume governments where to try and keep the real price of energy from dropping by e.g. 
using taxes in order to compensate for gains in energy efficiency. This would mean that those 
who could not keep up with technological progress would face ever rising costs of energy 
services as they would face the barriers to energy efficiency as presented in section 5.1. 
Particularly, those who would be prevented from upgrading e.g. household appliances, cars 
due to the cost of doing so will most likely be low-income households, making such an 
approach seem unfair. Additionally, as was pointed out in section 4.2, technological advances 
are often made in “leaps”, which makes them hard to foresee. If taxes were designed to reflect 
this, end-users who did not install the latest equipment would be subject to unpredictable 
prices, which is negative for investment (Schipper & Meyers, 1992, pp 312-3). Furthermore, 
should equipment be able to be replaced as energy efficiency improves, depending on how 
much could be recycled, the high turn-over rate for cars, household appliances, etc., would 
consume energy in order to produce new equipment. As pointed out by Levett (2009), the 
improvements in energy efficiency are different for different equipment, which, together with 
the inability for low-income households to keep up, “would have complex redistributive 
effects between different people and energy using products, and have more effect on some 
needed to neutralise rebounds, and less on others” (Levett, 2009, p 196). 
 
Again, consider equation (5.1.1.4): 
 
ηQW PP = . 
 
The objective of raising taxes on is to ensure that the price of the energy service, PW, does not 
drop as a result of the energy efficiency, η, rising. This means that the energy price, PQ, rises. 
An issue with this is that this is the price which will be visible to consumers, which could 
bring instances of money illusion, i.e. the phenomenon that consumers focus on nominal 
prices rather than real ones when making decisions, into play. Some research suggests that 
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there is a bias towards nominal prices versus real prices in decision-making (Fehr & Tyran, 
2001). 
 
As described above, the debate regarding how energy productivity and energy consumption at 
the economy-wide level is yet to be resolved. In the case that there is a difference between 
policy-driven efficiency gains and those occurring “naturally”, as proposed by Grubb (1990), 
governments can continue promoting energy efficiency. If those who believe in economy-
wide backfire are correct, then doing so would be entirely counter-productive. During periods 
of high oil prices such as during the oil crises of the 1970’s, energy demand is expected to 
fall. As explained above, during the same periods measures to increase energy efficiency were 
undertaken in order to reduce dependence on oil. According to Herring (1998), “whether this 
is due to the adverse consequences of higher fuel prices on economic activity or energy 
efficiency improvements, was a matter of fierce dispute.” The fact that the price elasticity of 
demand is proven to be quite small at the micro-level does not preclude that higher levels of 
aggregation bring with it increased consumption of energy as technological advancements are 
made. The lack of scientific consensus of what happens at the economy-wide level makes it 
impossible to conclude what implications there are for energy policy. Therefore, using the 
findings regarding the rebound effect at the micro level seems more appropriate. 
 
Because the rebound effect arises when the price of energy decreases an implication is that 
policies which strive to raise the price of energy would be more efficient than non-price 
policies in terms of mitigating the rebound effect. As taxes can be set higher on goods and 
services for which the demand is inelastic (see e.g. Rosen & Gayer, 2009, chap. 16), energy is 
a prime candidate for high energy taxes, which is also the case in Sweden. Depending on how 
large the demand which is constrained by high prices or low supply is, the rebound effect will 
be large or small. Some research of how energy use at the economy-wide level is affected by 
energy efficiency improvements can lead to conclusions that pursuing policies aimed at 
increasing energy efficiency is counter-productive. Most research, however, does show while 
there are rebound effects, improving energy efficiency does reduce energy use. 
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8 Concluding remarks 
Energy efficiency has often been regarded as something of a silver bullet to reigning in energy 
consumption which is desirable for a number of reasons, the most urgent of which, in recent 
years, is to decrease emissions of pollution associated with the burning of fossil fuels causing 
environmental degradation and contributing to climate change. Energy efficiency programs 
are an integral part of many countries’ energy and environmental policies, among them 
Sweden.  
 
This paper has showed how rebound effects arise as a result of consumption patterns adjusting 
to lower real prices of energy brought on by more efficient energy use. In the presence of 
rebound effects, policies which aim to promote energy efficiency may not be as effective as 
often assumed. Economists agree that there are rebound effects but not on their magnitude. 
Empirical studies at the micro level have shown that the rebound effects are small, usually no 
more than a few percent. Given the lack of empirical evidence at the economy-wide level for 
rebound effects and the evidence for an absence of large rebound effects at the micro level, a 
continued pursuit of energy efficiency as a means to reduce energy consumption seems to be 
suitable. 
 
Rebound effects prove to be part of a system which is fraught with feedback loops, both 
positive and negative, which makes it dynamic, non-linear and hard to predict. Understanding 
how these effects arise and interact is crucial to designing effective policy. This paper has 
presented some, but surely not all of these feedbacks.  
 
Government policy can be used to counteract the rebound effects. This paper has showed that 
the changes in real price of energy services caused by the efficiency improvement is a strong 
contributor to the rebound effect, implying that keeping the price of energy and thereby 
energy services high through government intervention may reduce the rebound effects. 
Because increasing the real price of energy is one way to induce the development of more 
efficient energy services, these policies may also have the benefit of mitigating rebound 
effects. However, targeting prices is not unproblematic: different energy-consuming 
equipment develops at different and often unpredictable rates, and not everyone will afford to 
keep upgrading their equipment.  
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8.1 Future research 
There are many issues which would be interesting to study further in order to better 
understand how the rebound effect can be mitigated by policy measures. More research on 
how the economy-wide rebound effects work is desirable in order to resolve the debate 
regarding this. Without a deeper understanding of this, it is difficult to determine if energy 
policy should target energy efficiency. While there is a greater degree of consensus regarding 
rebound effects at the micro level, there are some areas which would benefit from more 
research. For example, it would be of great importance to determine if energy services which 
are the subject of energy efficiency policies targeting prices are more resilient to rebound 
effects, ceteris paribus, as the findings of this paper indicate should be the case.  
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